Madhurima Pramanik | Lead, Bangladesh, TNS Desk/ TheEdition | [ madhurima@TheNewsSite.In] |
All eyes are on Bangladesh as the country is just days away from holding much-anticipated national elections on February 12, 2026, that are being held a year and a half after the ouster of then prime minister Sheikh Hasina on August 5, 2024, after fifteen years in office. The elections, being held under the auspices of the Interim Government headed by Nobel laureate Mohammed Yunus, are significant as they would end the period of political vacuum in the country, and also help rebuild institutions, restore public trust, and redefine the rules of political competition. However, following the death penalty imposed on Hasina in absentia by the country’s International Crimes Tribunal for crimes against humanity, her party Awami League has been barred from contesting the elections.
The voter turnout in the past three elections since 2014 has fallen significantly. While in 2014 it was less than 40%, in 2018 it stood at 27.31% which fell to less than 20% in the last 2024 election. When the Interim Government, led by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, entered office on August 8, 2024, it came with broad public support and a reformist mandate. However, it has faced severe criticism from all the existing parties for its inability to fulfill the promises and the delay in handing over power by conducting a peaceful election. Finally, as the election heads nearer, a question mark hangs over a smooth democratic transition. The durability of democratic changes depends highly on two interlinked factors: the implementation of the July National Charter and the willingness of political parties to internalize democratic norms beyond their political motives.
Aspiration of the July National Charter and the Interim Government
The July National Charter presents an ambitious vision for democratic reform, which ultimately depends on the upcoming parliament. Any genuine progress will therefore require a politics-oriented dialogue, a convincing electoral management, and the involvement of the main parties in overcoming polarization and sustaining trust in the democratic transition.
To implement the reforms, the Interim Government formed 11 reform commissions on issues of governance, the design of the constitution, the judiciary, public administration, and anti-corruption. The results of these commissions were afterwards merged into an overarching reform program, eventually giving birth to the formation of the National Consensus Commission (NCC) in February 2025.
One area that has received special emphasis during this process has been electoral reform. On October 3, 2024, the interim government constituted the Electoral Reform Commission, headed by Dr. Badiul Alam Majumdar, Secretary of Citizens for Good Governance (SUJAN). The commission was tasked with creating a roadmap for a transparent and accountable electoral process. After months of consultation, its final report—comprising over 200 recommendations—was published on February 8, 2025. The commission proposed proportional representation system and developing a bicameral system with the creation of an upper house to increase representation for women and minorities. The recommendation for implementing proportional representation was especially important as, until now, there has not been such representation in Bangladesh’s politics. Among its most consequential recommendations was the adoption of Proportional Representation (PR), the creation of a bicameral parliament with the formation of an upper house, and enhanced participation of women and minorities. The current First‑Past‑the‑Post (FPTP) model is criticized as “winner‑take‑all”, which historically marginalized the small political parties. A PR system, in contrast, facilitates seats proportionally giving the smaller parties a better chance of representation.
A national referendum, scheduled to coincide with election day, will place 30 reform proposals agreed upon by political parties in the July Charter before voters. These include limiting the Prime Minister’s tenure, empowering the presidency, electing a Deputy Speaker from the opposition, and increasing women’s representation in parliament. Crucially, implementation of these proposals is intended to be binding on whichever party/alliance forms the next government. Voters will be required to cast a separate ballot with four brief points and choose either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. A ‘Yes’ vote will make the July Charter binding, while a ‘No’ vote will render it ineffective.
Planning for Transparency
The Election Commission has emerged as both a central institutional actor and a site of partisan contestation. The Representation of the People (Amendment) Ordinance 2025, promulgated by the President in November 2025, codifies many of the recommendations made by Dr. Badiul Alam Majumdar’s reform commission to ensure the February 12, 2026 elections are transparent. It introduces measures to enhance transparency: higher campaign spending limits, reinstatement of the “No Vote” option, and expanded EC authority to annul results in cases of irregularity. The expatriates for the first time in the history of Bangladesh can take part in the election. A mobile application is provided for them to register their name and they can take part by postal service. The EC cancelled the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs), citing operational and credibility concerns, and ruled that alliance candidates must contest under their parent party symbols. Administratively, it has finalized polling‑station lists, completed most procurement, and reassigned field officials to ensure neutrality.
To maintain order, the EC is integrating the armed forces into its law‑enforcement command structure under civilian oversight. While supporters argue this is necessary for stability, civil‑society groups warn of the risks of over‑militarization. The transparency of the expatriates postal voting system also faces controversy, as the postal votes will have to travel a long way to the election commission of Bangladesh.
Youth, Gen Z, and the Politics of Renewal
The 2026 election unfolds in the shadow of the July movement, which began as a student‑led anti‑quota protest and evolved into a broader democratic uprising. Students and young voters now occupy a central place in Bangladesh’s political imagination.
According to the latest figures of the Election Commission, the total number of young voters is close to 45 million – between the ages of 18 and 33 and their votes will determine which party comes to power, making youth a potential game‑changer in the election. The Interim Government appointed student leaders in advisory roles and has been openly encouraging the National Citizen Party (NCP), a student‑led political formation.[1] [2]
A three-day Gen Vote festival was held in Mahakali, Dhaka in December 2025 with the aim to encourage first‑time voters to participate in the electoral process. The rise of youth‑led parties, alongside anticipated participation from first‑time and diaspora voters, suggests a reconfiguration of political mobilization.
Still, optimism is tempered by persistent structural constraints. Candidate selection within parties remains opaque, women continue to be underrepresented, and the growing appeal of extremist and hardline groups risks eroding Bangladesh’s secular political foundations. Prior to election, several female members of NCP have resigned, alleging that the party “has ultimately turned into a patron of right-wing forces.” The elections have already showed a huge gender gap as most of the parties have failed to provide a single female candidate, leaving only 62 female candidates in total in the fray. One can observe a preference towards right wing Islamist parties in the upcoming election.
Party Preferences:
Regarding the voting preference of the citizens, a joint study was conducted by Projection BD, International Institute of Law and Diplomacy (IILD), Jagoron Foundation, and Narrative among 22,174 voters from 295 constituencies across 64 districts of Bangladesh between 21st November and 20th December, 2025.
The survey estimates that BNP will receive 34.7 percent of the vote, while Jamaat-e-Islami will receive 33.6 percent. An estimated 17.0 percent of voters remain undecided. Based on the results, 72.1 percent of the voters who voted for the BNP selected the party’s experience and capacity to govern the state as the main reason.
Fig 1: Public support vote share
Source: Pre-Election Pulse: An In-Depth Analysis of the Bangladeshi Electorate Survey Report; chart prepared by the author.
Voters in favor of Jamaat-e-Islami stressed the honesty of the party’s candidates and their promise of change. Of Jamaat’s voters, 44.87 percent mentioned fewer cases of corruption, while 40.7 percent chose honesty as their vote’s rationale. In the case of NCP supporters, 36.77 per cent of the respondents preferred their political party because of its role in the “July Revolution.” Additionally, the survey showed that 17 percent of the respondents are undecided voters. Among those, 30.17 percent feel they don’t trust any political party, and 38.6 percent didn’t give any answer. Regarding the findings, Shafiul Alam, Press Secretary to Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus, has maintained that the undecided voters might turn out to be ‘game-changers’ in the election result.
Implementation
Keeping aside the internal differences, all the participating parties have endorsed the July Charter in principle, it includes a formal dissent section addressing contested clauses. This compromise enabled broad participation but has raised doubts about post‑election commitment—particularly once parties gain power.
Throughout 2025, the National Consensus Commission struggled to reconcile disagreements over timing and sequencing. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) argues that implementation should follow the election to avoid “procedural overreach” by an unelected interim authority. In contrast, Jamaat‑e‑Islami and allied Islamist parties favor a pre‑election referendum to lock the reforms in place. The NCP occupies a middle ground, proposing simultaneous parliamentary elections and the formation of a limited constituent body. It has also suggested renaming the Charter the “Bangladesh Constitution 2026” and requiring public officials to swear a renewed oath—a symbolic break with authoritarian rule.
An NCC implementation plan drafted in October requires enforcement of Charter provisions within nine months of the next parliament’s seating. Yet the absence of penalties for missed deadlines leaves enforceability uncertain, highlighting the reform process’s dependence on political will.
The democratic transition of Bangladesh would likely face severe challenges. Currently the BNP has an upper hand considering its ruling history in the state, but as the entire political journey of the BNP is revolved around anti-Awami League politics, the absence of the Awami League can increase the popularity of Islamist parties, especially Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh. Furthermore, proportional representation is likely to bring a coalition government to power. A coalition government is expected to be unstable, which will lead to further instability in state governance. Back in 2001, Bangladesh witnessed a four-party alliance with BNP, Jamaat, Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ), and Jatiya Party (Naziur faction), although BNP was dominant in the alliance, limiting the coalition bargaining, but instability emerged in 2006, which broke apart the coalition, leading to military intervention in 2007-08. As the state is moving towards a democratic transition, a cautious step is expected. The citizens have to see the long term outcome of every decision they will make as the nation deserves a peaceful, democratic governance which will ensure the rights of every individual.
[ Edited by Ms Ranjeeta. ]
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