Dr. Angana Kotokey
The Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 reopened the question of whether armed resistance would re-emerge in Afghanistan. In the years since, the global attention has shifted to the Taliban’s international engagement and its strict gender policies. But the fight against the regime continues, particularly in northeastern Afghanistan — historically the cradle of resistance.
Yet, in the four years since the Taliban seized Kabul, the story of resistance has changed. While groups such as the National Resistance Front (NRF), Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), and smaller factions like the Soldiers of Hazaristan continue to operate, the movement has failed to evolve into a unified or strategically potent force. Instead, the Taliban has adapted its tactics — moving from battlefield conquest to ‘sub-national governance’, micromanaging dissent, and weakening resistance through administrative and economic control.
A New Era of Resistance — But Not the Same as Before
The north and northeast of Afghanistan have long been described as the “last line of defense” against Taliban rule. In the first Taliban regime (1996–2001), resistance was organized and territorially grounded. The Northern Alliance — a coalition of former warlords and factions — operated like a government in exile, holding key cities and maintaining a degree of statehood.
But the resistance that started in 2021 in the northeast has continued to operate, though its power is now more symbolic than structural. The NRF, led by Ahmad Massoud, remains the most prominent group. Alongside it are AFF, led by former military officer Mohammad Yasin Zia, and smaller factions such as the Soldiers of Hazaristan. Although these groups claim to represent the anti-Taliban sentiment of the region, these factions have lacked the strategic coordination and international backing that once made northern resistance formidable, despite their repeated claims of numerical strength. Their tactics have become largely asymmetric, with attacks having been sporadic, often targeted, and rarely capable of reclaiming territories. Their capacity to mobilize popular support has also been limited by economic collapse, resource constraints, and an inability to build an enduring political framework. Without these elements, resistance forces struggle to challenge the Taliban’s growing influence in the north, which has grown more strategic, not only in warfare but also in governance. Since 2021, the Taliban has been engaged in what scholars describe as “sub-national governance” — a process of integrating local populations into the state apparatus while neutralizing dissent through economic dependency, administrative control, and selective repression.
Military Victory to Governance Strategy
The Taliban’s return to power was expected, but the speed and scale of their victory surprised many. Their takeover was not simply a military success; it was a demonstration of strategic modernization. Some scholars describe this as the rise of a “Neo-Taliban” — a group equipped with enhanced coordination, technological capacity, and a broader vision of state control. This time, the Taliban’s victory was not confined to territorial gains; their broader strategic objective was to push beyond their traditional strongholds in southern Afghanistan into provinces that had resisted their rule during their first regime, including in Takhar, Badakhshan, Panjshir, and Baghlan.
But instead of attempting to bring down the resistance solely through military might, the Taliban has focused on integrating these regions into its governance system. This marks a major shift from the Taliban’s earlier conventional strategy, which relied heavily on battlefield domination and coercion. Today, the regime is focused on “micromanagement” — minimizing resistance through governance tactics that create dependency, control resources, and co-opt local elites.
Sub-National Governance: The Taliban’s New Strategy
The Taliban’s transition from military dominance to administrative control is most evident in Panjshir — the epicentre of resistance. In 2023, the Taliban appointed Mohammad Hakim Agha as governor of the province, a political move that reflects this new approach—adapt governance to local realities. Agha is not just an administrator; he is a close associate of the Taliban’s supreme leader, Amir Hibatullah Akhundzada. His Dari language skills (believed to be uncommon among many Taliban officials) and cultural familiarity with the local population have helped him gain a degree of acceptance among local communities. His appointment is therefore considered to be a calculated move to counter the narrative of a revived “Khorasan” — a concept promoted by some resistance factions, including the diaspora.
By placing a Dari-speaking governor in Panjshir, the Taliban is not only consolidating control but also seeking legitimacy and presenting itself as more than a purely Pashtun movement. The move signals that the regime is willing to adapt its leadership to local realities, using language and cultural familiarity as tools of governance. This approach is not merely an administrative reshuffling. It is part of a broader strategy to normalize Taliban rule in the northeast through local engagement rather than continuous confrontation, using sub-national governance to gain legitimacy and control.
Economic Leverage: Co-Option Through Necessity
The Taliban’s sub-national governance strategy is not limited to administrative appointments. It also involves exploiting socio-economic vulnerabilities. The northeast is a region of seasonal labour migration, with many working-aged men traveling to neighbouring countries, particularly to Iran, for work. Since 2021, deportations from Iran have surged, forcing thousands of returnees back into Afghanistan with little to no resources. These returnees often find themselves dependent on Taliban-controlled aid, land allocation, employment, and administrative approval. Their interactions with the regime are mediated through local officials, religious leaders, and community elders. No doubt, this engagement is pragmatic rather than ideological. It is a survival strategy — a “deal” in which basic security and access to resources are exchanged for acceptance of the Taliban’s authority. In effect, economic desperation has become a tool of governance. It allows the Taliban to expand its influence without direct military confrontation. The regime’s ability to provide minimal stability and resources gives it leverage over populations that might otherwise resist.
Recruitment and Co-Optation: Turning Youth into Instruments of Control
The Taliban has also leveraged economic collapse, poverty, and unemployment to recruit young men from Panjshir and northeastern provinces into its security apparatus. A March 2025 report indicates that nearly 600 young men from Panjshir were incorporated into the Taliban’s Ministries of Defence and Interior, with another 1,500 to be recruited to protect the regime’s interests in the province. These recruitment drives serve a dual purpose: They provide employment for struggling youth while also embedding Taliban authority in local communities. The regime’s ability to offer jobs and status is a powerful tool for weakening resistance. In fact, recruitment has become part of a broader sub-national governance strategy — integrating young people into administrative and security roles to stabilize control and reduce dissent.
Control Through Resource Management
Another crucial element of the Taliban’s governance strategy is resource management. The northeastern provinces are rich in minerals and have long been linked to illicit drug-trade networks. During the republic era, many of these networks were controlled by former officials and local warlords. Rather than dismantling this economic order, the Taliban has chosen to co-opt it—by incorporating it into its governance structure. In many areas, village elders are used to organize militias that oversee illicit networks. This approach allows the Taliban to maintain control while co-opting local elites. The result is a mutually beneficial arrangement: the Taliban gains revenue and stability, while local power brokers retain influence. This strategy is mirrored in the management of mining resources and other economic assets, where both the regime and resistance factions seek to benefit from the region’s untapped wealth.
Resistance in the Shadow of Governance
Despite the persistence of resistance in northeastern Afghanistan, the movement remains limited. Without territorial control, international support, a unified political strategy, a credible alternative, and a coherent plan to mobilize local populations, the resistance is unlikely to challenge the Taliban’s growing authority significantly. Moreover, the Taliban’s sub-national governance strategy has reduced the need for a direct confrontation. By offering minimal stability, economic access, and local administrative engagement, the regime has appeared to succeed in weakening resistance—through co-option rather than force.
A New Reality in Afghanistan’s Northeast
The Taliban’s evolution from battlefield insurgents to administrators reflects a broader transformation in their approach to power. They have moved beyond military dominance and developed a system of governance that micromanages dissent at the local level. In Panjshir and other northeastern provinces, the Taliban is not only fighting resistance; it is managing it. Through administrative appointments, economic control, and recruitment, the regime has established a new form of authority — one that is less visible but more enduring. The result is a new kind of Taliban rule: one that does not rely solely on force but on governance mechanisms that make resistance difficult and costly.
For the anti-Taliban movement, the challenge is clear. Without strategic evolution, unity, and external support, the resistance will remain a fragmented force — unable to reclaim the northern provinces or challenge the Taliban’s sub-national governance model. As Afghanistan completed its fourth year under Taliban rule, the conflict now appears to have shifted from frontlines to local administration.
[ Dr. Angana Kotokey is an Indian researcher, focused on Af-Pak issues. Her recent publications include “‘Afghanistan’—the Transnational Connection between the Haqqani Network and the Arab World,” published in Small Wars & Insurgencies (Routledge), and “The Ideological Trajectory within the Taliban Movement in Afghanistan” (co-authored with Anchita Borthakur), published in the Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (Routledge).]
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