Dr. Vishwajeet Singh Akhawat | Research Associate/ Iran Specialist, Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi |
The recently signed Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding collapsed as Iran and the United States resumed their hostilities. The US is targeting Iranian military capabilities and, in turn, Iran is targeting US bases in the Gulf as well as other locations like Jordan. The initial period of the war had demonstrated Iranian resilience, but the recent phase of hostilities suggests movement towards a more dangerous phase where both sides are increasingly becoming prisoners of their strategic assumptions. Washington, at the beginning, believed that sufficient military and coercive pressure would compel Tehran to concede. Now Tehran risks committing a similar error by acting under an assumption that wartime leverage over the Strait of Hormuz can be used to permanently alter the regional maritime order.
In the first phase of the conflict, despite enormous military pressure exerted by the combination of the US and Israel, the Islamic Republic did not collapse. This effectively demonstrated the limits of coercive diplomacy. Iran showed institutional resilience and the depth of the Islamic Republic. Survival was the sole objective of the Islamic Republic. Under immense external pressure, the population coalesced around the flag and showed domestic cohesion, which helped Iran weather the attack while maintaining its core structure intact. Iranian victory in the first phase was political and not military—it survived.
Though continuity and survival gave the Islamic Republic a new lease of life, it would be a mistake to consider that a strategic and military success. The renewed confrontation between Iran and the US largely revolves around the maritime order in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran wants some sort of recognised authority legitimising its effective control over navigation through the Strait. Iranian authorities have argued that the MoU has given them this authority. The MoU, in reality, is very vague in what it says on the Strait of Hormuz and talks about dialogue between Iran and Oman on it.
While the ambiguity may have been necessary for both parties to arrive at an agreement, Iran believes that its interpretation is correct and sees shipping through the Omani route as a violation of the agreement. Tehran also saw Oman’s reluctance to engage in dialogue on the maritime arrangement as a clear indication of American pressure. This interpretation became one of the principal triggers for renewed hostilities and the eventual collapse of the agreement.
The recent escalation marks a strategic shift. The conflict is no longer centred around the Iranian nuclear programme or the lifting of sanctions. The Strait of Hormuz and its control have become a central concern for both warring parties. Iran sees long-term control over one of the world’s most important chokepoints as an important leverage and an effective deterrent against coercion by external powers. Control over Hormuz gives it not only a source of revenue but also the ability to influence the global economy, as around 20 percent of global hydrocarbons pass through it. This is a military-cum-strategic objective that carries risks fundamentally different from those related to the Iranian nuclear programme.
Iran Risks Overplaying Its Hand
Firstly, the regional countries that have advocated different approaches towards coercion and reconciliation are unanimous in their approach towards navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The freedom of commercial navigation through the Strait of Hormuz is non-negotiable. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Qatar might have different approaches towards managing their relations with Iran, but none of them is going to accept any arrangement that gives Iran a perpetual supervisory role over navigation through the Strait.
The geography that currently provides Iran greater leverage during war can become a constraint during peacetime if Iran finds itself at odds with all its neighbours. Gulf states may temporarily tolerate Iranian demands to prevent further escalation, but continued coercion is more likely to encourage long-term strategic diversification than acquiescence. Investments in alternative export infrastructure, overland energy corridors, expanded pipeline networks, and non-Hormuz maritime routes would almost certainly accelerate. While these alternatives may initially impose higher economic costs, they would gradually reduce dependence on a maritime chokepoint perceived as increasingly vulnerable to political coercion.
Such a situation would be a strategic paradox for Iran. In trying to exercise its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, Iran may ultimately reduce the Strait’s long-term strategic salience. Sustained coercion may force regional countries to reduce their exposure to the Strait. Already, some states, such as the UAE, have aggressively moved forward to circumvent what they might consider the Hormuz noose. Continuous disruption also might affect the relatively conciliatory posture of some of the Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Jordan. Incidentally, the recent escalation began with attacks on all of these states.
Even beyond the Gulf states, Tehran has found no takers for its strategic aims in the Strait of Hormuz. Its assumptions about the dependence of larger Asian buyers also deserve scrutiny. Major states such as India, Japan, and South Korea, which are being impacted by the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, have consistently maintained that unimpeded and uninterrupted commercial navigation is a vital strategic interest for them. None has shown willingness to endorse arrangements involving political oversight, tolls, or conditional access imposed by any regional power. Tehran may calculate that their dependence on Gulf energy will ultimately compel acceptance of a new maritime reality. Yet this assumption overlooks an equally plausible alternative. These states may instead accept higher transportation costs, diversify supply chains, and invest in alternative energy corridors rather than legitimise a precedent that permanently subjects international commerce to unilateral political leverage.
History has shown that wartime action often creates peacetime implications. These implications linger on for a long time. Adjustments undertaken during wartime and crises usually become permanent features of regional security. If Iran continues to emphasize utilising Hormuz primarily as an instrument of coercion, this will create the risk that states will strategically diversify, which will in turn reduce Iran’s future leverage.
Washington made an important error during the initial phase of the conflict by overestimating the capacity of coercive pressure, which it thought would lead to political capitulation in Tehran. Tehran’s success in exposing the limits of this assumption through resilience and endurance is known to all. Yet strategic success in resisting coercion should not be an encouragement to pursue coercive strategies of its own. The danger now is that Tehran will interpret its survival as evidence that it can permanently reorder the regional architecture through sustained disruption of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran would be better served by recalibrating its objectives and returning to negotiations. Endurance preserved the Islamic Republic during the war; strategic restraint may prove equally essential in securing its position after it.
[ Opinions expressed personal.]
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