Dr. Anchita Borthakur | Senior Research Associate, Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi |
Former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is expected to make her first major public appearance on August 5, the second anniversary of her departure from Bangladesh following the political upheaval of 2024. Ahead of her virtual address, organized by a private entity, she has already indicated her intention to return to Bangladesh before the end of the year. India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has clarified in a briefing that the Government of India has neither any involvement in nor endorses such events. However, her re-emergence in public life will be watched closely—not only in Dhaka but also in New Delhi, where the political implications of her presence have become increasingly difficult to separate from the broader trajectory of India–Bangladesh relations.
The timing is particularly significant. Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman is expected to visit New Delhi on the sidelines of the BRICS summit next month. At a moment when India and Bangladesh are attempting to stabilise their relationship after two years of political uncertainty, Hasina’s public appearance could revive unresolved questions over her political future, her presence in India, and New Delhi’s approach to Bangladesh’s internal political contestations.
India–Bangladesh relations have undergone a substantial transition since the overthrow of the Hasina government in August 2024. The initial months were marked by diplomatic caution, public mistrust, and considerable strain. India’s close association with the previous Awami League government became a source of criticism in Bangladesh, where anti-government sentiment was frequently intertwined with resentment towards New Delhi.
Yet the relationship did not collapse. Even during the interim administration led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, both countries maintained official communication, border-level coordination, and limited economic engagement. India adopted a cautious state-to-state approach while publicly supporting a stable, democratic, and inclusive Bangladesh. The post-2024 period was therefore one of recalibration rather than rupture.
From Personality-Driven Ties to Institutional Engagement
The election of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government under Tarique Rahman in February 2026 opened a new phase. Given the BNP’s historical emphasis on diversifying Bangladesh’s external relations beyond India, concerns initially emerged in New Delhi about a possible strategic realignment in the region. These anxieties were reinforced by Dhaka’s renewed engagement with China and Pakistan.
However, the early conduct of the Rahman government has been more pragmatic than confrontational. Prime Minister Narendra Modi was among the first foreign leaders to congratulate Rahman and invited him to visit India. Moreover, India was represented at his swearing-in ceremony by Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla, accompanied by senior government officials. Subsequent exchanges between political, diplomatic, and security officials indicated that both governments were interested in restoring predictability to the relationship.
The new Bangladeshi government’s foreign policy doctrine of “Bangladesh First” reflects Dhaka’s desire to maintain strategic flexibility, diversify partnerships, and respond to domestic political constituencies. For India, the challenge is to engage this government on its own terms instead of evaluating every Bangladeshi foreign policy decision through the prism of the Hasina era.
This is where Hasina’s renewed political activity becomes sensitive. Her continued presence in India has already created suspicion among sections of Bangladesh’s political establishment. Any public political campaign conducted from Indian territory could reinforce the perception that New Delhi remains invested in the restoration of the former regime. India’s MEA has categorically stated that New Delhi maintains strict neutrality and does not endorse any political activities that affect people-to-people ties between the two neighbours. New Delhi should avoid allowing Indian territory to become a platform for partisan political mobilisation against Bangladesh’s elected government. Otherwise, Hasina’s activities could become a direct diplomatic liability and undermine the gradual trust being built with the Rahman administration.
At the same time, Dhaka must recognise that India’s relationship with Bangladesh cannot be reduced to its association with one political party or leader. The two countries are bound by geography, economic interdependence, energy trade, security concerns, transboundary rivers, connectivity networks, and extensive people-to-people relations.
The two countries have significant prospects to boost their $16 billion bilateral trade. Bangladesh depends on India for essential imports, electricity, fuel supplies, and regional transit. India, in turn, regards Bangladesh as an important trading partner and a crucial gateway connecting its northeastern states with the Bay of Bengal and the wider region. The resumption of freight services and the India–Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline, as well as efforts to resolve difficulties surrounding projects financed through Indian lines of credit, demonstrate the practical foundations of the relationship.
Security cooperation is equally important. Bangladesh’s assurances that its territory will not be used against another country are particularly relevant to India’s Northeast. Continued intelligence sharing, border coordination, and action against extremist and insurgent networks must remain insulated from domestic political changes in either country.
Other unresolved issues require urgent attention. The Ganga Water Treaty is due for renewal in December 2026, while the Teesta water-sharing dispute continues to shape public perceptions in Bangladesh. These questions cannot be managed through episodic diplomacy. They require technical negotiations, basin-level planning, and an approach that considers changing river flows, climate pressures, and the requirements of communities on both sides.
People-to-people relations also need rebuilding. The decline in medical visas after 2024 had a direct impact on Bangladeshi citizens and damaged India’s public standing. Therefore, visa normalisation, educational exchanges, cultural engagement, and youth-oriented outreach can help address the growing generational distance between the two countries.
In addition, the evolving political worldview of younger Bangladeshis is no longer shaped only by memories of the 1971 Liberation War. Many now assess India through contemporary issues, including border incidents, visas, domestic political rhetoric, and New Delhi’s perceived support for former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. It should be noted that historical goodwill cannot substitute for sustained public diplomacy.
Hasina’s August 5 appearance, organized by a private entity, will undoubtedly attract political attention. But India must resist allowing the future of its Bangladesh policy to revolve around the political fate of one former leader. Its priority should be a stable, institutional, and non-partisan relationship with the government and people of Bangladesh.
Similarly, the Rahman-led BNP government must avoid using Hasina’s presence as a permanent explanation for bilateral tensions. Both countries have far greater strategic and economic interests at stake.
The expected meeting between Prime Minister Modi and Rahman offers an opportunity to reinforce this transition from personality-driven diplomacy to institutional engagement. The future of India–Bangladesh relations will depend less on who occupies office at a particular moment and more on whether both sides can protect cooperation from domestic political upheavals.
[Opinions expressed personal, not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of TheNewsSite.In.
In Featured Video: Awami Leaders spoke to TheNewsSite.In’s Ayanangsha Maitra. ]
Get real time update about this post category directly on your device, subscribe now.
