India’s BRICS Summit: Can Cuba and Bolivia give Global South a Boost?

[ Ambassador C Rajasekhar |  India’s Former Ambassador to Cuba, Latin America Specialist |  ]

As the 18th BRICS Summit is in session in New Delhi (September 2026), alongside other nations spread across the world, Bolivia and Cuba’s inclusion into the group as partner countries from the Americas anchors the group’s identity in the Global South, lending political diversity and representative legitimacy. This expanded architecture demonstrates that multipolar diplomacy thrives on inclusive, pragmatic engagement rather than rigid, homogenous alignment. The New Delhi Declaration officially announced that China will assume the BRICS rotating chair in 2027, hosting the 19th Summit. This transition is favourable for both La Paz and Havana.

Architecture of Inclusion: Beyond the Core

The evolution of BRICS from a narrow economic acronym, into a sprawling coalition representing nearly half the global population and 40% of GDP required an innovative diplomatic vehicle. The partner-country category, populated thus far by ten countries, has served that purpose.

This tier may be more than a waiting room of second-class membership; it may serve as a conduit for structured, sovereign participation. By incorporating countries with varied economic models and governance traditions, BRICS can save itself from any criticism of ideological exclusivity, while offering vulnerable economies a global forum.

Perspectives, and Expectations

Bolivia and Cuba approach the BRICS ecosystem through distinct national imperatives, yet both find common ideological and economic ground under the banner of South-South cooperation. Currently, both states occupy the official partner-country status, allowing them to participate in ministerials, summits, and institutional working groups, without immediate voting rights.

• Bolivia’s Pragmatic Horizon: La Paz views the framework through a resource-and-trade lens. Possessing critical lithium reserves and expanding agricultural output, Bolivia expects BRICS to serve as a direct institutional bridge to mega-markets like China and India, bypassing traditional Western intermediaries. It expects targeted technological transfer and alternative development financing to break free from traditional sovereign debt traps.
• Cuba’s Strategic Resistance: Havana perceives its partnership as an essential diplomatic shield and a platform to resist the crippling, U.S. economic blockade spanning six decades. For Cuba, alignment with a multipolar coalition offers it voice in multilateral forums and hope of alternative commercial networks. Cuba needs and expects concrete assistance in navigating financial exclusions and securing energy stability.

Operational Realities: Trade and Financial Mechanisms.

For partner states, the appeal of BRICS lies in its tangible alternatives to traditional Western-dominated financial infrastructure. Rather than forcing a unified currency—a concept India explicitly rejected—the bloc focuses heavily on the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative (BCBPI) and the deployment of BRICS Pay. These decentralized payment and messaging systems function independently of the U.S.-monopolized SWIFT network.

For Cuba, which faces restricted access to international dollar-based clearing systems due to Washington’s sanctions, these alternative channels can be revolutionary. It allows Havana to conduct direct trade settlements using national currencies—such as the Russian Rouble—greatly mitigating the bite of unilateral economic blockades.

Concurrently, the BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy 2030 provides partner countries institutional linkages. Bolivia gains access to specialized supply-chain diversification mechanisms. By participating in the BRICS Startup Innovation Fund and agricultural cooperation frameworks, Bolivia can negotiate bilateral market access for its critical minerals and lithium directly with the world’s hungriest industrial hubs.

Furthermore, the expanding reach of the New Development Bank (NDB) creates a crucial safety valve. While full capital access remains tied to sovereign shareholding, partner nations can look forward to targeted infrastructure and sustainable energy project financing under the bank’s open-architecture mandate, free from the structural austerity strings typical of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank.

What They Got in the New Delhi Declaration 2026

These partners should not expect immediate monetary windfalls or utopian treaties; rather, they may look at incremental systemic adjustment. What these partner nations secured in the New Delhi Declaration (adopted September 12, 2026) was quite substantive:

1. Condemnation of Unilateral Sanctions: The declaration expressed serious concern over unilateral tariff and non-tariff measures that distort trade, explicitly aligning with Havana’s and La Paz’s resistance against economic coercion.
2. Commitment to Local Currency Trade: The summit delivered a unified push toward trade settlement in local currencies and decentralized digital payment systems, giving Cuba a clear roadmap for survival mechanics.
3. Institutionalized Inclusivity: The declaration formally welcomed partner states into specialized working groups on sustainable development, counter-terrorism, and energy security, enabling their voices directly shape global governance frameworks.

Full Membership Trajectory: Prospects

While partner status is secured, the trajectory toward full, voting BRICS membership may face institutional bottlenecks.

The prospects are driven by a push from member states like Russia and China to rapidly expand the bloc into an undeniable counterweight to the G7. Full membership would grant Bolivia and Cuba voting rights on the expansion of the New Development Bank and veto power over future admissions, solidifying their geopolitical stance.

However, the problems are two-fold:

The Consensus Bottleneck: BRICS operates strictly on consensus. While Russia and China support swift expansion, core members like Brazil advocate for a slower, more cautious consolidation phase to avoid diluting the core cohesion. Brazil remains highly sensitive to expanding the Latin American footprint without a clear economic equilibrium.

Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities: Cuba’s inflationary crises and financial constraints, and Bolivia’s volatile economic shifts, make core members hesitant to extend full-scale mutual financial obligations or unconditional banking liquidity.

The Road to 2027: Next Chair’s View

Beijing views Bolivia and Cuba as critical geopolitical and economic anchors in Latin America. For China, Bolivia represents a vital pillar in its global supply chain for green transition minerals (specifically lithium). Cuba serves as a historic, highly strategic partner that helps expand China’s footprint in the Western Hemisphere.

As the next chair, China can be expected to advocate upgrading the operational capacity of the partner tier. Beijing aims to deepen their integration into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure networks, even while full membership remains a gradual climb; the economic returns of the partnership materialize rapidly. New Delhi consensus has thus cemented their status as valued stakeholders.

[ Opinions expressed personal. Under syndication arrangement. ]