Dr. Kaveri Jain| Japan Specialist|
A new regional economic vision is taking shape in the Bay of Bengal, but where does India fit in? During Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s October 27 summit with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, Bangladesh and Japan agreed to upgrade the Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt (BIG-B) into “BIG-B for Shared Prosperity”. The development strengthens the Japan–Bangladesh bilateral foundation of the wider regional vision, while raising a larger question: how, and to what extent, could India be integrated into this evolving framework?
For much of the 2010s, Bangladesh occupied a consequential place in the Indo-Pacific architecture as the third point in an informal triangle linking Tokyo and New Delhi. The arrangement was never institutionalised through a charter or secretariat; rather, it emerged from two strong bilateral relationships converging around connectivity, industrial development and the shared objective of linking India’s Northeast to the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia. The political upheaval of 2024, Muhammad Yunus led interim administration and the return of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) to power in February 2026 have raised an important question in both Tokyo and New Delhi: can the triangle be rebuilt and on whose terms? The challenge is not simply to revive earlier patterns of cooperation, but to determine whether converging bilateral interests can translate into a more sustainable trilateral framework.

Japan-Bangladesh- India: How the triangle came together
The emerging trilateral relationship rested more on political trust than on formal institutional design. Shinzo Abe’s close relationship with successive Indian prime ministers gave India–Japan ties their post-2012 momentum, anchored in his 2007 “Confluence of the Two Seas” speech and the emergence of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. Abe also cultivated close ties with Sheikh Hasina, and Japan became one of Bangladesh’s largest development partners and a major provider of concessional finance in South Asia. India also expanded its stake in Bangladesh, resolving longstanding land boundary disputes, increasing bilateral trade beyond $15 billion, and extending approximately $8 billion in lines of credit between 2015 and 2023.
The trilateral dimension emerged most clearly in Northeast India. Japan supported connectivity linking the region through Bangladesh to Myanmar and Southeast Asia, while the India–Japan Act East Forum, established in 2017, aligned Tokyo’s FOIP vision with India’s Act East Policy. The idea briefly took on a more explicit trilateral character during the 2023 Agartala conference, which brought together officials from all three countries. India’s contribution extended beyond infrastructure finance. The 131.5-kilometre India–Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline became operational during this period, while arrangements allowing Bangladesh to import Nepali hydropower through Indian transmission lines advanced alongside wider initiatives through the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).
Matarbari and the built environment
The BIG-B framework received a significant political upgrade during Tarique Rahman’s October 26–29, 2026 visit to Japan. At the October 27 summit, PM Rahman and Takaichi agreed to advance the initiative as “BIG-B for Shared Prosperity”, organised around four pillars: strengthening connectivity; preparedness for natural disasters and geopolitical risks; public-private partnerships to co-create economic opportunities and rule-making; and cooperation for peace and stability. The leaders described Bangladesh as a hub for a Bay of Bengal region of shared prosperity, with cooperation expected to integrate power, energy, deep-sea port, industrial and information and communication technology infrastructure. Japan indicated that private investment by Japanese companies of approximately ¥1 trillion could be expected over the next five years. This is a prospective investment expectation and its realisation will depend on project preparation, the investment climate and private-sector decisions.
The visit also produced six bilateral cooperation instruments and pledges for two yen-loan projects worth a combined ¥46.56 billion (approximately $295.5 million), alongside 17 private-sector memoranda of understanding. The areas covered included maritime security, improvement of the business environment, agriculture, fisheries and livestock, skills and employment, and climate-change cooperation. Japan also agreed to provide a grant of up to ¥2.12 billion for a patrol vessel to strengthen Bangladesh’s maritime security capabilities. These outcomes deepen the Japan–Bangladesh partnership and give BIG-B a broader economic and resilience agenda.
If the triangle has a physical anchor, it is Matarbari on Bangladesh’s southeastern coast. Its proximity to Northeast India means it has long been viewed as much a part of India’s eastern connectivity strategy as a Bangladesh-Japan project. JICA’s ¥217.6 billion ODA loan for the Matarbari Ultra Super Critical power project was paired with a deep-sea port conceived partly as an alternative to the proposed Chinese-backed Sonadia port and linked to Shinzo Abe’s 2014 BIG-B initiative. The initiative formed part of a broader joint economic development plan between Bangladesh and Japan aimed at transforming Bangladesh into an inter-regional economic and industrial hub connecting South and Southeast Asia.
Japanese support has since expanded significantly. In 2023, JICA extended a further ¥165 billion infrastructure loan on top of an earlier ¥38.8 billion commitment, underlining the scale of Tokyo’s investment in the corridor. Fumio Kishida’s 2023 Bay of Bengal-Northeast India Industrial Value Chain Concept further integrated Matarbari into plans connecting Bangladeshi and Indian industrial zones with Southeast Asia.
The broader significance of Matarbari also lies in its integration with the Moheshkhali–Matarbari Integrated Infrastructure Development Initiative (MIDI), supported by Japanese technical cooperation. The initiative reflects an integrated approach to infrastructure planning, bringing together ports, roads, railways, energy facilities and industrial zones. This is particularly important because a deep-sea port’s economic viability depends on efficient hinterland connectivity, customs infrastructure, reliable energy supplies and the development of industries capable of generating cargo, in addition to its maritime capacity. For India and Japan, developing this integrated industrial ecosystem could create opportunities to connect Bangladesh’s emerging economic corridors with Northeast India and wider Southeast Asian markets.
The July 2026 India–Japan Annual Summit reaffirmed support for industrial value chains linking Northeast India and the Bay of Bengal through BIMSTEC, signalling a shift from infrastructure connectivity towards manufacturing ecosystems and supply chains. This broader industrial vision was reinforced in July 2026 when Japan agreed to increase its energy-sector support for Bangladesh from US$312 million to US$500 million, reflecting growing Japanese engagement in the energy infrastructure needed to sustain industrial growth. Developments such as the Jamuna Railway Bridge, Ramgarh-Baraiyarhat Highway, Mirsharai industrial facilities and Dhaka Metro illustrate the growing importance of infrastructure and industrial connectivity within Bangladesh. Alongside these projects, regional frameworks such as the BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement offer a potential basis for improving cross-border movement and strengthening wider economic integration.
Railways have become central to the vision of better connectivity. JICA financed around 60 per cent of Dhaka Metro’s Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) Line 6 and continues supporting Lines 1 and 5 through Japanese soft loans. During a July 2026 visit to Dhaka, JICA’s president explicitly linked metro development with the wider Matarbari region, reflecting Tokyo’s view of urban rail, ports and industrial corridors as components of a single connectivity strategy. Cross-border projects have progressed more slowly. The Chilahati–Haldibari rail link and the Dhaka–Siliguri corridor remain dependent on sustained political cooperation between India and Bangladesh. This asymmetry – steady Japanese investment but politically contingent cross-border integration – accurately reflects the state of the triangle in 2026.

The rupture and an uneasy reset
Before 2024, India had sought to strengthen its regional role through connectivity initiatives and vaccine diplomacy. Hasina’s departure disrupted much of this political foundation. While Japan–Bangladesh and Japan–India ties remained stable, India–Bangladesh relations entered a period of uncertainty. Dhaka’s diversification of partnerships, including closer engagement with Beijing and Islamabad, and disagreements over Hasina’s continued residence in India complicated this. The February 2026 election reshaped the landscape once again. Tarique Rahman’s BNP secured a decisive victory, with turnout approaching 60 per cent. Narendra Modi was among the first leaders to contact Prime Minister Rahman following the result and India sent Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla to the inauguration ceremony.
The Rahman government has framed its foreign policy under the banner of “Bangladesh First”, emphasising national interests and diversified partnerships rather than alignment with any single power. The restoration of visa services, ministerial visits and leader-level engagement between India and Bangladesh suggests gradual normalisation, although political sensitivities remain. The October 2026 Japan visit has also brought India’s role in regional connectivity back into focus. Responding to questions about proposed links between the Matarbari port and India’s Northeast, Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal referred to India’s strong partnership with Japan and to initiatives involving Japan and India’s northeastern states, including efforts to strengthen regional linkages and Japanese-language training.
His remarks indicate India’s interest in strengthening the India–Japan connectivity track and its potential interface with developments in Bangladesh. However, Jaiswal did not announce or confirm any specific trilateral India–Bangladesh–Japan project. The distinction matters: complementary bilateral initiatives and overlapping regional interests may create conditions for trilateral cooperation but they do not in themselves constitute an agreed trilateral mechanism or project. Tokyo, meanwhile, has sought to maintain continuity in its engagement regardless of political changes in Dhaka. For New Delhi, rebuilding trust and institutional momentum may take longer, making wider trilateral initiatives dependent on the pace of bilateral normalisation.
People and Healthcare: The labour-mobility track
A recent shift also concerns people, not just infrastructure. According to the Recruit Works Institute, Japan’s labour shortages could exceed 11 million workers by 2040, creating demand across both skilled and semi-skilled sectors. Bangladesh’s young population makes it an increasingly attractive partner. The Bangladeshi community in Japan grew from 9,115 in 2013 to 31,536 in 2024 and 40,045 by mid-2025. Although still significantly below flows from Nepal and Vietnam, the figures indicate a substantial increase in the Bangladeshi community in Japan.
In 2025, Japanese industry associations and Bangladesh’s Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET) agreed to recruit 100,000 Bangladeshi workers over five years, alongside expanded language and vocational training programmes linked to Japan’s Technical Intern Training and Specified Skilled Worker schemes. At the same time, Japanese firms are increasingly turning to India’s Global Capability Centres for software engineering, artificial intelligence and digital services. Around 100 Japanese GCCs currently operate in India and that number is expected to almost double by 2030.
Healthcare provides another illustration of this emerging division of labour. Bangladesh’s medical-device market is expected to nearly double during the decade, while JICA’s 2026 health-sector mission brought eight Japanese companies to explore opportunities in medical technology and diagnostics. Projects such as the Ship International Hospital in Dhaka and proposals for Japanese investment in Bangladeshi pharmaceutical and medical equipment manufacturing reflect a growing convergence among healthcare, labour mobility and industrial cooperation. More Indian nurses and healthcare professionals are also exploring opportunities under Japan’s Specified Skilled Worker (SSW) and related programmes, while Bangladesh is positioning itself as a source of caregivers, technical workers, and vocational labour for Japan’s ageing society.
Taken together, these trends point to an increasingly complementary regional division of labour: India increasingly supplies digital services, engineering talent, and healthcare professionals, while Bangladesh positions itself as a source of manufacturing workers, technicians, and caregivers for Japan’s demographic transition.
Garments: An opportunity meeting a looming transition
Bangladesh’s garment sector employs more than four million workers and generated US$38.7 billion in exports during FY2025–26, accounting for around 80 per cent of national export earnings. Japan has become an increasingly important market. Apparel exports rose from US$1.086 billion in FY2023–24 to around US$1.4 billion in 2025–26, with industry leaders now targeting US$3 billion in exports to Japan within the next one to two years.
Bangladesh’s scheduled graduation from Least Developed Country (LDC) status on 24 November 2026 presents new challenges. Estimates suggest apparel tariffs could rise to around 9 per cent in Japan and over 8 per cent in India after graduation, although figures vary across studies. Dhaka has requested an extension to the transition period, and the Committee for Development Policy has indicated this could be considered. The Japan–Bangladesh Economic Partnership Agreement signed in February 2026 may significantly ease the transition by preserving market access and supporting Bangladesh’s integration into regional value chains.
The sector also illustrates the wider complementarities underpinning the emerging Bay of Bengal industrial ecosystem. India remains one of Bangladesh’s principal suppliers of cotton and yarn, while Bangladesh has developed one of the world’s largest and most sophisticated ready-made garment (RMG) manufacturing bases, including the highest concentration of Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED)-certified green garment factories in the world. Japanese firms are also increasingly involved in supplying textile machinery, factory automation systems and industrial equipment that underpin Bangladesh’s transition towards higher-value and more sustainable manufacturing. Together, these strengths illustrate the broader logic of the triangle: Indian inputs, Bangladeshi manufacturing and Japanese capital and technology increasingly function as components of an integrated Bay of Bengal production network.
Beyond the garment industry, the emerging industrial ecosystem offers opportunities to diversify into electronics, automotive components, pharmaceuticals, agro-processing, and light engineering. Japanese technological expertise, industrial machinery, and production standards could support Bangladesh’s transition towards higher-value manufacturing, while India’s established industrial base, raw material supply networks, and technological capabilities offer additional complementarities. Developing these sectors could broaden the economic foundations of India–Japan–Bangladesh cooperation beyond traditional garment-sector linkages and create the basis for more integrated regional production networks.
Recent discussions involving Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), the Japan-Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JBCCI) and Japanese apparel firms suggest growing interest in expanding sourcing partnerships and industrial collaboration. Japan’s China Plus One strategy and the development of the Japanese Special Economic Zone at Araihazar may further strengthen Bangladesh’s position within Japanese supply chains and support deeper trilateral value-chain integration across the Bay of Bengal region. The zone is intended to host export-oriented manufacturing and deepen industrial integration with Japanese supply chains.
The China variable
China’s role has expanded considerably. Former Chief Advisor Yunus chose Beijing for his first bilateral visit as interim leader and Chinese interest in the Teesta River project attracted significant attention in India. The trend has continued under the Rahman government. During his June 2026 visit to Beijing, Bangladesh and China agreed to develop a Chinese-backed special economic zone near Mongla Port. According to Bangladesh Bank data, Chinese FDI stock in Bangladesh increased from $241 million in 2016 to nearly $2 billion by the end of 2025, overtaking India’s $923 million stock over the same period. China has also financed projects including the Padma Bridge Rail Link, the Karnaphuli Tunnel, the Cox’s Bazar projects, and the Payra Thermal Power Plant. Dhaka’s “Bangladesh First” approach views Chinese, Japanese and Indian investment as complementary options rather than geopolitical choices. The question is therefore not whether Bangladesh will engage with China, but whether India and Japan can continue to offer sufficiently attractive opportunities and partnerships alongside Bangladesh’s expanding engagement with multiple external partners.
For Dhaka, the challenge is to translate its geographical position into economic leverage without becoming dependent on any single external partner. India’s geographical proximity, Japan’s infrastructure financing and technological capabilities, and China’s expanding economic presence offer different opportunities for Bangladesh’s development. Consequently, BIG-B’s success will depend partly on Dhaka’s ability to maintain diversified partnerships while ensuring investment decisions serve domestic industrial priorities, financial sustainability, and long-term economic autonomy. For India and Japan, this also means demonstrating that their cooperation can generate tangible economic benefits for Bangladesh rather than being perceived primarily through the lens of strategic competition.
Where does this leave the triangle?
Three factors will determine whether the triangle regains momentum. First, whether India and Bangladesh can manage unresolved political sensitivities stemming from the 2024 transition without undermining economic cooperation. The second is whether projects such as Matarbari, BIG-B and the Jamuna corridor evolve into integrated industrial value chains linking Bangladesh, Northeast India and Southeast Asia. The third is whether labour mobility, healthcare cooperation and human-capital partnerships mature into a genuine third pillar alongside cooperation in trade and infrastructure. Since 2024, the triangle has increasingly resembled two strong bilateral relationships connected by a weaker third side. The future of the triangle will ultimately depend on whether bilateral convergence can translate into practical trilateral cooperation that delivers shared economic benefits and contributes to a more connected and prosperous Indo-Pacific.
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